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Territorial Claims in the Domain of 
Accidental Harm 
CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF TORT PREEMPTION 
Robert L. Rabin† 
Territorial claims in the domain of accident law have a long and 
tortuous history. Criticism of tort as systematically failing to adequately 
compensate industrial injury victims led to a workers’ compensation 
movement in the Progressive era that literally swept the tort system 
aside, clearing the playing field for state-by-state no-fault compensation 
based on legislative/administrative benefits in place of tort adjudication.1 
Some fifty years later, in the late 1960s, a similarly-grounded concern 
about inadequate compensation animated the auto no-fault movement 
that complemented, and in some states partially replaced tort with yet 
another system of legislatively-designated benefits for the victims of 
motor vehicle accidents.2 
Then, in the mid-1970s, the tide turned. The focal point of 
institutional criticism of the tort system shifted dramatically from claims 
of under-compensation of injury victims to a perception that the system 
was overly generous (and unpredictably so).3 Nonetheless, for the better 
part of the next twenty years, one school of tort critics leveled their 
attacks at the internal dynamics of the tort system, pressing for legislative 
limitations on punitive damages, pain and suffering awards, and other 
remedial measures through caps and related stratagems.4 The reform 
efforts were incremental rather than territorial; that is, displacement of 
tort was not a priority agenda item. 
  
 † A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Peter 
Schuck, Catherine Sharkey, and Stephen Sugarman for helpful suggestions, and to Sai Jahann for 
valuable research assistance. 
 1 See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN AMERICA 197-215 (1994); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and 
the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967). 
 2 The movement was animated by the Keeton-O’Connell plan. See ROBERT E. KEETON 
& JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965). 
 3 An early milestone enactment was the California Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act (“MICRA”) in 1975 addressing claims by the medical profession of excessive tort 
awards against physicians. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2009). 
 4 For discussion of the reform initiatives, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the 
Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207 (1990). 
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A more foundational critique emerged initially in the academic 
literature, in considerable part as a rejoinder to the expanding doctrinal 
reach of products liability law—with particular emphasis on the complex 
science and technology that was often critical to determining the 
outcome in defective design and warning cases.5 Critics posed the 
question of whether courts were up to the job with a negative rejoinder in 
mind. Juries, they asserted, could not weigh in a satisfying fashion the 
risk/benefit issues central to these cases, when compared to expert 
agencies.6  
Much of the early criticism came in the guise of proposals that 
courts recognize a regulatory compliance defense and defer to regulatory 
determinations in cases of conflicting territorial claims to 
decisionmaking authority.7 Thus, a prominent critic of the institutional 
competence of the tort system put his critique this way: 
[J]udicial nondeference may make some sense when the administrative 
regulatory regime is casual or sporadic, as with consumer products. But it is 
wholly unpersuasive for comprehensively regulated industries. Vaccines, 
pesticides, aircraft, electric power plants and the like all entail potentially 
enormous mass-exposure hazards. Precisely because they can create public 
risks of this nature, these products and services are also subject to the most 
searching and complete state and federal safety regulation. Administrative 
agencies may find it politically convenient to disclaim final responsibility for 
the public risk choices that inhere in such licensing decisions. But the simple 
fact is that an agency cannot intelligently issue a license for such public-risk 
activities without comparing the licensee’s risks to those of the competition and 
determining that the new offering represents some measure of progress or, at 
worst, no measure of regression in the risk market in question. 
Once that determination has been made by an expert licensing agency, the 
courts should respect it. Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk 
comparisons on which all progressive transformation of the risk environment 
must be based. The courts are simply not qualified to second-guess such 
decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regressive risk 
choices. Requiring—or at least strongly encouraging—the courts to respect the 
comparative risk choices made by competent, expert agencies would inject a 
first, small measure of rationality into a judicial regulatory system that 
currently runs quite wild.8 
  
 5 See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk 
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). For Huber’s mass-audience versions of 
the critique, see PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(1990); PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1993); see also 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980). 
 6 For a recent version of the critique, see Peter Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort 
Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008). 
 7 See AM. LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY 83-110 (1991); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort 
Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000). 
 8 Huber, supra note 5, at 334-35. 
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For a variety of reasons, the regulatory compliance defense never 
gained a firm foothold in the state courts.9 Only one state, Michigan, 
affords it full recognition (by way of legislation); a handful of other 
states treat it as a bar to punitive damages.10 Both the Products Liability 
Restatement and the Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm, give it only non-determinative “some 
evidence” status, reflecting the view of most states courts.11 
Meanwhile, however, a far more formidable challenge to the 
territorial claims of tort has arisen. Beginning in 1992, with the landmark 
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,12 the U.S. Supreme Court 
has decided a burgeoning number of preemption cases, squarely 
challenging the continuing vitality of tort in many domains of accident 
law.13 As I will indicate, Cipollone addressed the preemption question in 
an atypical context. The case did not involve competing claims to 
territorial authority between a regulatory regime and state tort law; 
rather, Cipollone involved a challenge to the continuing viability of tort 
in the face of statutory directives mandating explicit industry conduct.14 
  
 9 For discussion of the reasons, see Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory 
Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000). 
 10 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (2000) (codifying the regulatory compliance 
defense). For a recent review of the status of the regulatory compliance defense in state law, see Carl 
Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1026-27 nn. 158-61 
(2008). 
 11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (1998) (“In connection with 
liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or warnings: . . . (b) a product’s compliance 
with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in 
determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the 
statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product 
defect.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 cmt. b 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[I]n products liability cases, despite the quasi-contractual 
relationship between the consumer and the manufacturer, the latter’s compliance with custom in 
designing its product is only some evidence of the adequacy of the product’s design.”). 
 12 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 13 The principal Supreme Court decisions addressing preclusion in tort after Cipollone 
are Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), discussed infra Part II, Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), discussed infra Part II, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (preempting a stand-alone claim of fraud on the FDA in the approval 
process of a manufacturer’s orthopedic bone screws under the Medical Device Amendments), 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that neither the Federal Boat Safety Act 
nor the Coast Guard’s decision not to promulgate specific regulations preempted plaintiff’s state 
common law claim that her boat motor was unreasonably dangerous), Bates v. Dow Agrosciences 
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (refusing to preempt a claim of inadequate warning under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act after finding no inconsistency with the agency-approved 
warning), Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008), discussed infra notes 43-45, Altria 
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), discussed infra Part III.B, and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. 
Ct. 1187 (2009), discussed infra Part III. 
 14 The 1969 version of the cigarette labeling act, reviewed in Cipollone, required four 
explicit warnings to be used on a rotating basis: (1) “Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking Causes 
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy”; (2) “Surgeon 
General’s Warning: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”; (3) 
“Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature 
Birth, and Low Birth Weight”; (4) “Surgeon General’s Warning: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon 
Monoxide.” Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000)).  
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As one moves beyond Cipollone to the far more common 
situations in which it is agency regulatory directives, rather than statutory 
warning language that arguably preempt tort law, it is critical to keep the 
institutional competence question in proper constitutional perspective. 
Preemption cases do not raise a question for free-standing judicial 
determination of whether agencies are better constituted to impose 
optimal standards of industry conduct than courts. That is a question of 
common law deference raised by the regulatory compliance defense; it is 
not the question posed by a claim of preemption. In preemption cases, 
whatever the frustration engendered by the difficulties in discerning 
legislative intent, the question under the Supremacy Clause is 
inescapably whether Congress intended to displace tort law.15 
In Part I of this article, I will revisit Cipollone to reassess what it 
has to offer as a foundation for setting the boundaries of regulatory 
containment of the tort system. Then, in Part II, I will discuss three 
leading cases from the series of efforts by the Supreme Court to grapple 
with express preemption clauses in a variety of regulatory schemes.16 
Against this backdrop, in Part III, I will discuss the circumstances under 
which it might be justified to imply preemption despite the absence of an 
express provision.17 A concluding note will tie the strands together. 
I. CIPOLLONE REVISITED 
Forty years of tobacco litigation came to a crossroads in 
Cipollone. The tobacco industry defendants, looking for a knockout 
punch to eliminate a continuing barrage of claims by smoking victims of 
failure to adequately warn, argued successfully for preemption of these 
tort suits based on language in the cigarette package warning label 
legislation.18 The amended version of that legislation contained a 
preemption provision, which read: “No requirement or prohibition based 
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to 
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are 
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.”19 
  
 15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the United 
States “shall be the supreme law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). For a recent reassertion of this point, see Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543 
(“Our inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose 
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”).  
 16 The three leading cases I will discuss are Lohr, Riegel, and Geier, cited supra note 13.  
 17  In particular, I will discuss the recently decided Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009), addressing preemption in the context of prescription drug regulation. 
 18 The Court was sharply split: Justice Stevens wrote for a four-justice plurality, holding 
that the 1969 Act preempted failure to warn claims but not claims based on fraudulent concealment 
of material facts (or express warranties); Justice Blackmun wrote for three justices who rejected the 
displacement of common law tort claims; Justices Scalia and Thomas would have preempted 
categorically. 
 19 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
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Cipollone has been taken to be the foundational case on express 
preemption and in particular on the preclusion of common law tort 
through the reading of tort duties as “requirements.”20 In fact, Cipollone 
provided a questionable foundation for any broad equation of tort duties 
with “requirements.” As recently as Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,21 decided 
in the 2007-08 Term of the Court, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent, in 
a case involving the preemption provision in the Medical Devices 
Amendments, that Congress could have meant “requirements” as 
precluding only state regulatory schemes imposing requirements beyond 
federal standards.22 
The key to this continuing skepticism is straightforward. Tort 
duties do not “require” anything other than the payment of damages. If 
tort liability does lead a defendant to a private assessment in favor of 
greater future precautionary measures, then tort, of course, has had a 
regulatory effect.23 But tort itself dictates no particular change in a losing 
defendant’s conduct.24 Indeed, under a strict liability regime, tort imposes 
liability with total indifference to whether a defendant might reasonably 
have decided against investing in additional safety. High priority is given 
to compensating injury victims and/or risk-spreading.25  
But the Cipollone plurality did not meet the challenge head-on. 
Rather, the plurality’s pivotal point was statutory construction of the 
cigarette labeling act: that the changed wording in the 1969 preemption 
provision—statutory language that prohibited conflicting “requirements” 
  
 20 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992).  
 21 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 22 Id. at 1013-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 
544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005) (“An occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision does not 
qualify as a requirement. The Court of Appeals was therefore quite wrong when it assumed that any 
event, such as a jury verdict, that might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer to change its label should 
be viewed as a requirement.”); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (“The contrast 
between [the savings clause’s] general reference to ‘liability at common law’ and the more specific 
and detailed description of what is pre-empted by [the express preemption clause] indicates that [the 
preemption clause] was drafted to preempt performance standards and equipment requirements 
imposed by statute or regulation.”). 
 23 Tort as a regulatory regime has come to great prominence in the academic literature. 
For general discussion, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
513-17 (2003). For advocacy of viewing tort from a regulatory perspective in the context of 
preemption, see Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of 
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. art. 5 (2006); Schuck, supra 
note 6. 
 24 Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, made this point forcefully 
in Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 535-39. In fact, the same is often true of regulatory requirements: a violator 
who is willing to pay the penalty can ignore compliance. In general, however, the normative 
implications are quite different. 
 25 In this regard, see Justice Traynor’s landmark concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (“Those who suffer injury from defective 
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or 
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of 
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business.”). For articulation of this position in the context of rejecting a regulatory compliance 
defense claim, see Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
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rather than just “statements” (the 1965 statutory terminology)—
suggested a more expansive intent than the earlier limitation to 
conflicting state regulatory measures.26 Even so, the Cipollone plurality 
did not proscribe all tort litigation. Instead, it read the preemption 
provision narrowly to leave open the prospect of claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation against the tobacco companies.27 Indeed, in a nice bit 
of irony, tort claimants began to realize a measure of success for the first 
time immediately after Cipollone, as plaintiffs relied on the nearly 
contemporaneous discovery of tobacco industry documents revealing a 
pattern of deceptive practices by the industry as a foundation for non-
preempted tort claims.28 
What can be taken from Cipollone that might be useful in 
providing broader guidance when regulatory agency directives are 
satisfied but injury victims nonetheless argue for liability in tort? It 
seems sensible to think that when Congress enacted, and then 
subsequently refined, specific cautionary language required on cigarette 
package labels, it did not mean to have that very process and outcome re-
opened in another forum through tort claims of failure to adequately 
warn. This is the core meaning of so-called “conflict” preemption, and it 
seems questionable—in the absence of an explicit savings clause—to 
read Congress as desiring, in effect, penalties on compliance, even in the 
guise of compensation.29 
  
 26 The 1965 statute’s preemption clause stated: “(a) No statement relating to smoking 
and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any 
cigarette package; (b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the 
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of 
this Act.” Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5 (1965) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)) (emphasis added).  
 27 This issue resurfaced before the Supreme Court in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 
S.Ct. 538 (2008), when the defendant tobacco company sought to interpose a preemption defense to 
plaintiff’s claim of economic harm from purchasing “light” cigarettes under the supposition that 
there would be less nicotine and tar intake. Defendant argued that this was a health and safety claim 
barred by the proscription of requirements exceeding the statutorily-prescribed warning label. A 
majority of the Court (5-4) disagreed, holding that the claim was one of fraud in violation of the state 
consumer protection law, rather than one based on health and safety. Altria is discussed further in 
Part III.B. 
 28 See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING 
TOBACCO ch. 7 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).  
 29 This is a closer question than most proponents of preemption acknowledge, precisely 
because the well-established tradition of strict liability in tort poses a federalism challenge to conflict 
preemption—short of expressly-stated preclusion of tort. Thus, Professor Stephen Sugarman points 
out that compensation is a dominant concern reflected in state tort law and that there is no reason to 
think that federal regulatory legislation is indifferent to that concern—i.e., would be designed to 
extinguish it via preemption—unless there is explicit indication of that intent in the regulatory 
legislation. Moreover, the uniformity interest, offered as one justification for conflict preemption, 
does not override that concern because tort does not compromise uniformity; tort requires nothing 
beyond the payment of damages. E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Sept. 29, 2008) 
(on file with author); E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with 
author); E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
  In response, Professor Peter Schuck argues  
One simply cannot separate the compensation and regulatory issues without affecting 
drug manufacturer incentives in ways that are difficult to predict and that involve the 
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In the final analysis, there are competing considerations in 
resolving these preemption claims. On the one hand, it is beyond 
argument that Congress could limit preemption to conventional 
legislative and regulatory guidelines: Congress might recognize that tort 
plays a distinctive role in providing compensation to victims who suffer 
harm despite regulatory compliance. A regulatory regime like the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) provides no remedy to those who are 
injured despite compliance with regulatory directives. Correlatively, 
there is no inexorable principle that productivity gains from uniform 
national health and safety standards—a frequently invoked rationale for 
preemption—should be borne by injury victims in cases of residual 
harm. Moreover, once again, it is critical to underscore the dynamics of 
tort. Liability does not entail enforced departure from regulatory 
standards; it only compels payment of damage awards.30 
  
highest social stakes. The prospect of having to pay compensation under a strict liability 
rule, especially one not subject to a state-of-the-art defense, would surely increase the 
already large uncertainty that surrounds manufacturers’ large long-term investments that 
are necessary in order to develop socially valuable pharmaceutical products. It might also 
cause risk-averse manufacturers to include more in their labeling than would be optimal 
for consumers.  
Schuck, supra note 6, at 101 n.114. 
  But this argument does not seem entirely responsive. For one thing, it is detached from 
reading preemption with congressional intent as the focal point. Congress knows how to create 
statutory immunity from tort law when it is concerned about the welfare of an industry. See e.g., 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92 (2005) (eliminating liability of 
gun manufacturers and sellers when guns are used in criminal or illegal activities to harm third 
persons). And for another, it rests entirely on empirical assumptions about consequential effects on 
industry investment decisions that are not well-documented. Indeed, Schuck rests his argument in 
this regard on a single citation to a newspaper article, Stephanie Saul, Bristol-Myers to Eliminate 
4,800 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 6, 2007, at C1, discussing the decline in approvals of new drug 
formulations between 2006-07. See Schuck, supra note 6 at 78 n.21. The Saul article makes no 
mention of tort liability as an explanation for job elimination. To the contrary, it references 
“[g]eneric competition, a dearth of new drugs and a more safety-conscious posture by the [FDA]” as 
factors explaining industry-wide layoffs. The article goes on to note that Bristol-Myers “is facing the 
same problem as many of the other drug-makers: the looming loss of patent protection for an 
important drug.” Saul, supra. For further skepticism about the empirical assumptions, see Michelle 
M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA 
1817 (2005) (addressing the contraction of the vaccine suppliers’ market). 
  In the final analysis, one must discern congressional intent without clear guidance. But 
as I develop in the text, infra, the often-ignored compensation goal of tort, which has been prominent 
in the background when Congress has enacted regulatory legislation, provides a compelling basis for 
reading conflict preemption narrowly. See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical 
Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008). 
 30 In addition, Kessler and Vladeck emphasize the distinctive, searching nature of the tort 
discovery process even when compared to the new drug approval protocol: “The information-
gathering tools lawyers have in litigation are, by any measure, more extensive than the FDA’s. 
Indeed, the FDCA does not give the FDA the most important tool trial lawyers have—the right to 
subpoena relevant information from any source.” Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 491. But of 
course, there is a trade-off between the regulatory process that brings disciplined expertise to its 
review process, incorporating risk/risk analysis, and the determination by a lay jury in an adversarial 
process focused on the particulars of a plaintiff’s injury. 
  These strong, federalism-grounded arguments for taking a cautionary approach to 
displacing tort have, at times, led the Supreme Court to refer to a “presumption against preemption.” 
For the most recent example, see the majority opinion in Wyeth. 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009). 
But as Professor Sharkey has argued, the Court has shown no consistency in invoking the 
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On the other hand, it is similarly clear that Congress can 
preclude recourse to tort if it chooses to do so. Immunity from liability 
for accidental harm is not an unknown proposition, and in addition to the 
benefits from nationally uniform health and safety standards, there is the 
institutional competence argument for making regulatory standards 
determinative: in the recent context of Riegel v. Medtronic, that the FDA 
has far greater expertise than juries in deciding optimal design and 
warning standards for medical devices.31 
If Cipollone is a good starting point in highlighting these cross-
cutting considerations, a more focused exploration of the parameters of 
preemption requires discussion of the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
efforts to forge a sensible pathway through the conflicting territorial 
claims of federal regulatory agencies and state tort law. 
II. BEYOND CIPOLLONE: THREE LEADING CASES 
Nearly two decades have passed since the Cipollone venture into 
the domain of tort. In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court has had 
numerous occasions to demarcate the boundaries of preemption with 
greater precision.32 Since every such effort has entailed a contextualized 
exercise in discerning Congressional intent, it is perhaps not surprising 
that commentators find little guidance in the Court’s performance.33 In 
my view, however, by focusing on a limited number of recent decisions, 
it is possible to point the way to a sensible working principle for 
resolving the tension between regulation and tort generated by 
preemption claims.  
I begin with the Medical Devices Amendments to the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act (MDA), which authorized FDA approval of new 
medical devices prior to marketing.34 In establishing the regulatory 
regime, Congress enacted an express preemption provision that has 
provided the Supreme Court with two opportunities—roughly a decade 
apart—to weigh in on the preclusive effect of the statute on tort claims.35 
  
presumption. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455-59 (2008). In my view, invoking the presumption (or ignoring it) 
is of no operational consequence. 
 31 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); see also discussion of Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
 32 See cases cited supra note 13. 
 33 See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 30, at 459-71 (“The Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence reflects an incoherent, and at times internally inconsistent, conception of the tort-
regulation pas-à-deux. . . . The Court has oscillated between competing conceptions of tort as either 
primarily regulatory or compensatory, with the regulatory view justifying preemptive results and the 
compensatory view compelling the opposite.”). 
 34 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2006). 
 35 The Medical Devices Act preemption provision, reads as follows: 
[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for 
human use any requirement— 
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In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,36 the Court interpreted the MDA in a fashion 
that left tort claims undisturbed.37 Ruling to the contrary in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,38 the Court rejected a tort suit under the same 
preemption provision.39 Despite these contrasting holdings, the 
Lohr/Riegel tandem offers a useful perspective on what should be the 
critical factor in determining conflict preemption, as I see it: an analysis 
of whether the agency directive was grounded in the same evidence-
based risk/benefit inquiry as the tort process would entail.  
In Lohr, the plaintiff’s defective design claim was based on 
injury from the malfunctioning of a pacemaker inserted to correct a 
cardiac irregularity.40 The FDA had approved the device under the 
“substantial equivalence” provisions of the Amendments, a fast-track 
system under which new devices that appeared to be substantially similar 
to medical devices already on the market could be certified without 
independent testing of the product.41 There was, in other words, no 
evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry by the FDA, focused on the precise 
design of the defendant’s pacemaker; hence, there was no basis for a 
claim that the tort suit would be going over the same ground as the 
regulatory process. As a consequence, a comparative institutional 
competence claim for displacing a tort suit seemed unwarranted.42  
Riegel provides a counterpoint to Lohr that brings home the 
essential point. Plaintiff’s design defect claim in Riegel was based on the 
rupturing of a balloon catheter, manufactured by defendant, during an 
angioplasty procedure.43 The device had been cleared for marketing in 
the FDA’s product-specific pre-market approval process, not via the fast-
  
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 
Id. at 360k(a). 
 36 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 37 Id. at 503. 
 38 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 39  Id. at 1006, 1011. 
 40 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480-81. In both Lohr and Reigel, the Court characterizes the claims 
as design defects, rather than manufacturing defects (that is, departures from the intended design). 
Id. at 483. See generally Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 ( discussing design requirements to which medical 
devices are subjected in the approval process). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., 
§§ 2(a), 2(b) (1998). There is general agreement that tort claims based on injuries from 
manufacturing defects, which are departures from the approved product, are not preempted. 
 41 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(f)(1) (2006).  
 42 But might not the “substantial equivalence” determination be grounded in full-scale 
premarket approval of the earlier product? This remote possibility that the new product tracks the old 
in all material particulars, and that nothing substantial has occurred in the risk universe in the 
intervening time, is further put to rest in U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-
190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES 
ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS (2009), a highly 
critical review of the “substantial equivalence” process. See also Gardiner Harris, In F.D.A. Files, 
Claims of Rush to Approve Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 13, 2009, at A14. 
  43 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005 (majority opinion). 
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track “substantial equivalence” process relied on in Lohr.44 Contra to 
Lohr, the Court preempted state tort claims, emphasizing that “premarket 
approval is specific to individual devices,” and referring to the 
substantial equivalence process in Lohr as an exemption rather than full-
scale safety review.45 
A third leading case, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.46 
offered a refinement that contributed to identifying the pathway for 
future territorial limitations on the tort domain. Geier, which involved 
interposition of a preemption defense under the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act,47 posed a not uncommon obstacle to 
conventional preemption analysis: the Act on its face appeared to 
equivocate on the displacement of state tort law (if not rejecting 
displacement entirely) by providing a “saving” clause—to the effect that 
“[c]ompliance with [a federal safety standard] does not exempt any 
person from any liability under common law.”48 At the same time, the 
Act contained an express preemption provision for regulatory safety 
standards.49 
Plaintiff sued in tort on a design defect theory, arguing that his 
injuries were enhanced by the absence of a driver’s side airbag; 
defendant responded by asserting a preemption defense based on a safety 
standard adopted by the DOT that allowed for the phasing in of air bags 
over time.50 At trial, defendant introduced testimony on technical 
feasibility, cost considerations, and consumer acceptance concerns that 
led the agency to opt for a graduated approach to the mandating of air 
bags.51 
But how was the Court to reconcile the seeming ambiguity 
created by both preemption and saving clauses appearing in the same 
  
 44 Id. at 1006.  
 45 Id. at 1007. A caveat, however, will be relevant to my further discussion. Justice Scalia 
nowhere in the opinion mentions victim compensation as a complementary goal that Congress might 
also have in mind, along with risk-benefit considerations, in enacting regulatory legislation. Indeed, 
he refers to the possible reading of preemption as extending only to state regulatory activity, but not 
state tort law, as a “perverse distinction.” Id. at 1008. But the distinction is only perverse if one 
totally ignores the fact that state regulatory law offers nothing by way of compensation to accident 
victims, unlike tort law, which does double-duty in promoting both regulatory and compensation 
objectives. See also infra note 56. 
 46 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 47 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 
(1988). 
 48 Id. § 1397(k). 
 49 Id. § 1392(d) (“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under 
this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either 
to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle 
equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item 
of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.”). Note that in this preemption clause, it 
is not a “requirement” that is equated with tort liability, but a “safety standard.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 
871.  
 50 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865; see Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208; Occupant 
Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2003). 
 51 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-78. 
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regulatory scheme? The Court’s resolution was to read congressional 
intent as limiting the saving clause to regulatory directives adopted by 
the agency that set a floor on safety, rather than those grounded in 
risk/benefit balancing.52 With reference to the air-bag regulation, the 
Court regarded no-air-bag tort claims as directly inconsistent with the 
optimality of a phased-in scheme of safety enhancement envisioned by 
the agency.53 
What is perhaps most interesting, however, about the Geier 
opinion is that the saving clause compelled the Court to take cognizance 
of a broader set of systemic congressional purposes than one finds in the 
advocacy of categorical preemption proponents, as well as in later cases 
like Riegel, which focus exclusively on tort as a competing regulatory 
regime.54 Contrary to this constrained reading of congressional intent, 
Justice Breyer remarked that: 
[T]he saving clause reflects a congressional determination that occasional 
nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only 
create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing 
necessary compensation to victims. That policy by itself disfavors pre-emption, 
at least some of the time. But we can find nothing in any natural reading of the 
two provisions that would favor one set of policies over the other where a jury-
imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal safety standard.55 
In my view, there is no reason to think that simply because a 
saving clause is not present in a regulatory scheme, Congress has 
necessarily turned a blind eye to this concern for tort as a mechanism of 
injury compensation—again that is, apart from the situation of “actual 
conflict” referred to by Justice Breyer.56 
  
 52 Id. at 868. 
 53 Id. at 874. The Court makes reference to “frustration-of-purpos[e]” as a rationale for 
invoking preemption, id. (alteration in original), and this factor is sometimes treated as an 
independent trigger for the defense. But as I see it, frustration of purpose—in Geier and more 
generally—is simply one variant in expressing the prospect of directly competing risk/benefit 
analysis that is the crux of the test for satisfying conflict preemption.  
 54 For advocacy of this categorical approach, see Epstein, supra note 23; Schuck, supra 
note 6. 
 55 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (emphasis added). Justice Breyer’s concession regarding 
congressional sensitivity to the compensation goal can plausibly raise the question of why a saving 
clause should not be taken as a legislative expression of intent to limit the preemption clause to 
conflicting state regulatory directives. It certainly can be argued that this is a more natural 
reconciliation of the preemption and saving clauses than that adopted by the Court, which resolved 
the facial conflict by relegating saved tort claims to regulatory directives meant to establish a floor 
on safety. Those latter directives would create no conflict with tort claims even without a saving 
clause. 
 56 In response to the Riegel decision, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) remarked, 
“Congress never intended that F.D.A. approval would give blanket immunity to manufacturers from 
liability for injuries caused by faulty devices,” and Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) added, 
“The Supreme Court’s decision strips consumers of the rights they’ve had for decades. . . . This isn’t 
what Congress intended, and we’ll pass legislation as quickly as possible to fix this nonsensical 
situation.” Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices From Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). These reactions are not conclusive, of course, on 
legislative intent, but surely Kennedy and Waxman, leaders in the enactment of the Medical Devices 
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If a saving clause coupled with a preemption provision poses one 
set of interpretive conundrums, what of a regulatory scheme that makes 
no explicit reference at all to tort through a preemption clause? Under 
some circumstances can a congressional intent to preempt be nonetheless 
implied? The following Part will address that question with special 
reference to the context of prescription drug regulation by the FDA. 
III. IMPLIED PREEMPTION: PRESCRIPTION DRUG REGULATION AND 
BEYOND 
The Supreme Court faced its latest challenge in the preemption 
arena in Wyeth v. Levine,57 involving the highly-contested question of 
preemption in the prescription drug area.58 Critical to the inquiry is that 
new prescription drugs are certified for marketing by the FDA under a 
different statutory scheme than the Court reviewed in the Lohr/Riegel 
tandem involving new medical devices—and it is a statutory scheme that 
has no express preemption provision.59 Thus, the case raised a question 
of implied preemption in an especially dynamic area of tort litigation.  
In Levine, plaintiff’s arm had to be partially amputated after 
gangrene set in following a botched injection of the anti-nausea drug, 
Phenergan, by a so-called “IV push” procedure (direct injection into a 
vein) that mistakenly missed the mark and mixed the drug with arterial 
blood. Plaintiff argued inadequate warning of the risk of amputation 
associated with the IV push method—the risk that in fact came to 
fruition. In response, defendant Wyeth pointed to the explicit language 
  
Amendments (“MDA”), are more privy to congressional deliberations on congressional aims than 
Justice Scalia, who concluded his armchair speculation with the comment that 
it is implausible that the MDA was meant to “grant greater power (to set state standards 
‘different from, or in addition to’ federal standards) to a single state jury than to state 
officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes.” That 
perverse distinction is not required or even suggested by the broad language Congress 
chose in the MDA, and we will not turn somersaults to create it.  
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 504 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (citation omitted).  
  That the MDA was intended to grant significant power to a jury is “implausible” only 
if one reads the desire to compensate victims, via tort liability, entirely out of the purview of 
Congress. While I support the Court’s conclusion in Riegel, where the tort suit would revisit the 
regulatory approval process with no claim of changed circumstances, it is quite another matter to 
adopt the broader implausibility rationale. 
 57 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  
 58 FDA regulation of prescription drugs is the focus of much of the recent scholarly 
commentary on preemption. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products 
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007); Epstein, supra note 23; Margaret Gilhooley, 
Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug 
Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347 (2008)Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29; Richard A. 
Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L., art. 4 
(2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products 
Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 415 (2008); Schuck, supra note 6. 
 59 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 
(2006). 
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on the label that warned about the risk of amputation, and further noted 
that it had, in fact, sought to revise the warning to re-word the reference 
to the risk of amputation, and was instructed by the FDA to retain the 
existing warning.60  
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 margin, upheld the Vermont state 
court’s damage award, premised on a rejection of the preemption 
defense. The majority opinion, however, does not treat the absence of an 
express preemption clause as determinative of the outcome. Instead, the 
majority places great emphasis on the FDA’s “changes being effected” 
(CBE) regulation, which provides that a manufacturer can take the 
initiative to strengthen a product risk warning without prior agency 
approval when “safe use of the drug product” would warrant such 
action.61 Despite evidence of “at least 20 incidents prior to [Levine’s] 
injury in which a Phenergan injection resulted in gangrene and an 
amputation,”62 Wyeth had not sought—nor had the FDA taken any action 
to preclude—a stronger warning. 
Hence, in the majority’s view, there was no direct conflict 
between plaintiff’s tort claim and the agency’s earlier, now possibly 
outdated, approval. Indeed, the majority opinion suggests a sharply 
restrictive test for establishing conflict preemption: “absent clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change in Phenergan’s 
label, we will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply 
with both federal and state requirements.”63 There is no hint here of the 
preemption determination resting on a distinction between express and 
implied congressional intent; instead, the dominant theme is consistent 
with the redundancy principle that, as I have expressed it, seems 
consonant with reconciling tort and regulatory functions.64 
  
 60 The warning on the label read in part: 
Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly used for 
intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular 
extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent 
intra-arterial injection of Phenergan Injection, usually in conjunction with other drugs 
intended for intravenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical irritation, severe spasm 
of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requiring amputation are likely under such 
circumstances. Intravenous injection was intended in all the cases reported but 
perivascular extravasation or arterial placement of the needle is now suspect. There is no 
proven successful management of this condition after it occurs. . . . 
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1192 n.1. Wyeth’s proposed revision was read by the Court as a formatting 
change rather than a heightened warning of risk. See id. at 1192 n.5. 
 61  21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008). 
 62  Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197. 
 63  Id. at 1198. 
 64  See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. An alternative pathway for determining that 
the regulatory directive reflects meaningful consideration of the risk/benefit analysis that would be 
undertaken in the tort claim is spelled out in the “agency reference model” proposed by Professor 
Sharkey, supra note 30; for more detailed discussion, see her follow-up article, Sharkey, supra note 
58. As a prelude to determining the agency directive/tort preemption issue, Sharkey would require 
that: 
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Moreover, the “implied” preemption characterization of new 
drug approvals is not quite as straightforward as commentators suggest. 
In fact, the FDCA has an express saving clause that provides: “Nothing 
in the amendments . . . shall be construed as invalidating any provision of 
State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments 
unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments 
and such provisions of State law.”65 
Whether one views this provision as a saving clause, or instead 
as a narrow preemption clause, depends on the spin that is put on “unless 
there is direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such 
provision of state law.”66 Whichever characterization is adopted, the key 
correlative question is whether the “provision of state law” language is 
read, like “requirements” in earlier-discussed cases, as including state 
tort awards. Since the Wyeth majority found no direct conflict between 
the agency action on Phenergan and a failure to warn claim, there was no 
occasion to address this issue.  
This narrow reading of conflict preemption, in turn, puts to rest 
the broader position taken by the FDA (and defendant in Wyeth) that 
agency approval of a new prescription drug categorically displaces later 
tort relief for an injury victim.67 This is a salutary development. I see no 
  
courts should look to agencies to supply the empirical data necessary to determine 
whether a uniform federal regulatory policy should exist—as agencies are in the best 
position to gather and evaluate data—and to make informed choices regarding the 
welfare of the American public.  
 
Sharkey, supra note 30, at 452-53. 
  There is appeal to this judicial “hard-look” position and it certainly would be 
beneficial if agencies would follow Sharkey’s lead on their own initiative. But I have three 
reservations about the courts imposing the requirement as a judicial initiative as Sharkey proposes. 
First, there is no plausible reason to read this stipulation into congressional intent as an intrinsic 
feature of the preemption inquiry. Second, the inquiry seems in part to miss the mark. While it would 
make a great deal of sense to have the agencies submit findings to support their risk/benefit analysis 
because that goes directly to the issue of comparative institutional competence, which is the central 
determinant (and rationale) for conflict preemption, I fail to see what expertise the agency has to 
supply in predicting the value of uniformity, which is not an element of the agency protocol for 
regulatory approval. Finally, I am concerned that imposing this requirement on the agencies would 
be an invitation to ex post rationalization (i.e., building a paper record after the fact). 
  Having expressed these reservations, I would emphasize that Sharkey’s proposal is in part 
meant to focus the preemption inquiry precisely in the right direction, as I see it. See Sharkey, supra 
note 58, at 423 (“[W]hen it comes to making an implied conflict preemption determination, it is 
critical to discern whether the FDA has weighed in on the precise risk the state action likewise seeks 
to regulate.”). 
 65 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962). 
 66  Id. 
 67 During the Bush administration, the FDA, along with other regulatory agencies, took 
this position, venturing beyond contained conflict preemption in a series of regulatory preambles. 
See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). The FDA preamble declares that: 
“FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act . . . 
preempts conflicting or contrary State law.” Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for 
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, at 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006). For 
discussion, particularly focused on the FDA, see Sharkey, supra note 30, at 504-05, 511-13. See also 
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29. 
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reason to think that Congress, in enacting regulatory schemes like the 
provision for premarketing review of new prescription drugs, entirely 
lost sight of tort as the sole medium for providing victim compensation 
when injury occurs after an agency certifies a new product for marketing. 
As a consequence, I would read conflict preemption narrowly, confining 
it, as previously indicated, to cases in which plaintiff’s claim is based on 
agency action grounded in the same evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry 
as the tort process would entail.68 
Under this narrowly-framed preemption defense, what are the 
principal types of tort claims that survive? Most importantly, claims 
should survive that are based on substantial new evidence of risk arising 
after a product design has been approved if the agency has failed to 
weigh in on the new findings in a determinate manner at the time of 
product use by the injury victim. I read the Wyeth majority opinion as 
consistent with this position: the majority appears to embrace the 
  
  The Wyeth majority gave short shrift to the FDA preamble, which had been inserted 
into an agency rule without public notice-and-comment, referring to it as “an agency’s mere 
assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 
1201.  
 68 Like Sugarman, supra note 29, Kessler and Vladeck argue that the compensation goal 
should in effect read preemption out of new drug approval cases:  
[T]he moment the FDA approves a new drug is the one moment the agency is in the best 
position to be the exclusive arbiter of a drug’s safety and effectiveness. On that day, the 
FDA has had access to and has devoted considerable resources to reviewing carefully all 
of the extant health and safety data relating to the drug. On that day, and that day only, 
we agree that the FDA’s determinations about labeling ought not be subject to re-
examination by courts or juries in failure-to-warn cases. 
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 465. They attach great weight to the 2007 Amendments to the 
FDCA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 467-69. 
Those provisions give the FDA greater authority to monitor post-approval risks associated with a 
drug, and to require labeling changes and safety studies by manufacturers. See id. at nn.23-25 (citing 
provisions of the FDCA). At the same time, however, Kessler and Vladeck assert that the 
Amendments codify “existing requirements that obligate drug manufacturers to provide up-to-date 
safety information to physicians and patients and authorize manufacturers to do so without first 
securing the FDA’s approval. The codification of this obligation undercuts the key pro-preemption 
argument the FDA and manufacturers make—namely, that the FDA alone decides the content of 
drug labels.” Id. at 468-69, (discussing FDAAA tit. IX, § 901(a), 505(o)(4)(I), 121 Stat. 823, 925-26 
(2007)). 
  Contrary to Kessler and Vladeck, Schuck reads the enhanced post-monitoring 
authority in the 2007 Amendments to support his case for categorical preemption of tort claims 
(apart from misrepresentations to the agency). See Schuck, supra note 6, at 83. It is a matter of 
whether one sees the glass as half-full or half-empty.  
  In contrast to both readings, I regard the Amendments as consistent with my position 
in the text. On the one hand, the manufacturer’s obligation to propose labeling revisions in light of 
access to new risk information seems germane to allowing a tort claim only so long as the FDA has 
failed to act on the information. On the other hand, the FDA’s bolstered authority to monitor and 
require labeling changes similarly generates a conflict situation only when the agency has taken 
post-approval action in view of the allegedly changed circumstances. Prior to the 2007 Amendments, 
post-approval monitoring by the agency was sharply criticized in Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 
(2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309103035/gifmid/R1.gif, and U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA’s Postmarket 
Decision-Making and Oversight Process (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf. 
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proposition that new risk information, not addressed in determinative 
fashion by the agency, provides the foundation for a state tort claim.69  
This category of surviving claims is a logical consequence of 
containing the comparative institutional competence argument for 
regulatory preemption within its own domain. If the tort claim rests on an 
assertion that substantial post-approval new evidence of risk has come to 
light, and has neither been incorporated into a revised warning, nor 
rejected by the agency as insubstantial, the foundational risk/benefit 
analysis on which agency certification was based is inapposite. Hence, 
the tort claim is not an effort to revisit and supersede the regulatory 
approval process.70 
A second critical category of surviving claims should be those 
grounded in misrepresentations made to the agency in the certification or 
post-approval process. Once again, this limitation on the scope of 
preemption follows from a purposive analysis of congressional intent. 
The agency’s certification process is not duplicated by a tort claim based 
on risk/benefit information that should have been provided to the agency 
but was not.71 On this score, I subscribe to Peter Schuck’s proposal that 
the “disclosure deficit,” as he calls it, lifting the preemption bar, should 
not be limited to instances of fraud.72 Like fraudulent misrepresentations 
to the agency, instances of innocent or negligent misrepresentation 
(including knowing failure to provide material data) undermine the 
foundation for preempting tort based on narrowly-conceived conflict 
grounds.73 
  
 69 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 at 1197. In fact, as I read the dissenting opinion, there is no 
disagreement on this proposition. Rather, the dissent contests that there was new risk information 
that compromised the adequacy of the existing label. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1122-25 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
  In Riegel, Justice Ginsburg had noted, “The Court’s holding does not reach an 
important issue outside the bounds of this case: the preemptive effect of § 360k(a) where evidence of 
a medical device’s defect comes to light only after the device receives premarket approval.” Reigel 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 n.1 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
  Commentators who advocate broad, “categorical” preemption, as Schuck calls it, see 
Schuck, supra note 6, at 102, would make no allowance for new risk information emerging after 
regulatory approval. His view rejects victim compensation as a complementary consideration, 
characterizing tort exclusively as a contrasting regulatory regime, see id. at 78, 93, a characterization 
that in my view is indifferent to congressional intent as the foundation for preemption analysis. See 
also Epstein, supra note 23 (advocating blanket preemption for FDA drug approvals based on the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme established by Congress). 
 70 This, of course, says nothing about the merits of the tort claim. At trial, a court might 
find the studies methodologically flawed or unpersuasive for any of a variety of reasons. Or the 
plaintiff might fail to establish a cause-in-fact relationship between her injury and the product. 
 71 In this regard, it is critical to note that FDA certifications, like those of other health 
and safety regulatory agencies, are based on data supplied by the applicant. See Kessler & Vladeck, 
supra note 29, at 491. 
 72 Schuck, supra note 6, at 102-05. 
 73 I would also support a threshold requirement that the pleading be with particularity, as 
advocated by Schuck, supra note 6, at 105-07; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
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Let me trace, in somewhat more detail, the contours of these two 
important categories of tort cases that should survive preemption defense 
claims grounded in purportedly superseding agency directives.  
A. New Evidence 
Two experienced participant/observers, one the former 
commissioner of the FDA, put the case for limiting the preclusive effect 
of agency directives in perspective: 
At the time of approval, the FDA’s knowledge-base may be close to perfect, 
but it is also highly limited because, at that point, the drug has been tested on a 
relatively small population of patients. Once the drug enters the marketplace, 
risks that are relatively rare, that manifest themselves only after an extended 
period of time, or that affect vulnerable subpopulations, begin to emerge. These 
are often not risks foreseen by the drug’s manufacturer or the FDA and, for that 
reason, are not addressed on the label.74 
Two recent, highly publicized controversies are illustrative of the 
post-approval issues raised by new evidence of risk that need to be 
resolved in aligning the domains of regulation and tort. Initially, I will 
discuss the scenario in the mass tort litigation arising out of claims that 
antidepressant drugs have triggered suicidal reactions.75 Then, I will turn 
to the claims of cardiac disease stemming from ingestion of the anti-
arthritis drug Vioxx.  
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,76 involved two consolidated wrongful 
death claims by survivors of adults who committed suicide, allegedly as 
a consequence of taking antidepressants. Collacicco committed suicide 
after beginning a prescribed regimen of ingesting the antidepressant 
Paxil; DeAngelis, the other decedent, had ingested Zoloft in the days 
before his suicide. Both drugs belong to the class of antidepressants 
known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which have 
triggered major scientific controversy in recent years over whether they 
promote suicidal tendencies.77  
Paxil bore a warning label deflecting any causal association: 
“[t]he possibility of a suicide attempt is inherent in major depressive 
disorder and may persist until significant remission occurs.”78 Zoloft bore 
a similar warning label, deviating only in referring to “depression” rather 
  
 74 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 466. 
 75 For detailed discussion, see Nagareda, supra note 58, at 25-36. 
 76 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 
(U.S. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 77 Related controversies involve causal effects in children and adolescents, although that 
was not an issue in Colaccico. For discussion of the scientific controversy, see Nagareda, supra note 
58, at 26 n.106; Nicholas Bakalar, Suicide Findings Question Link to Antidepressants, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2007 at F7; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Antidepressant Use in Children, 
Adolescents, and Adults, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/default.htm (last visited Feb. 
13, 2009).  
  78 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 256.  
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than “major depressive disorder.”79 The linch-pin for both the tort claims 
and the preemption defense was the fact that neither label indicated any 
causal relationship between ingestion of the drug and suicidal behavior.  
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims of failure to adequately 
warn, the Colacicco majority opinion supported granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants by documenting that for more than a 
decade before the suicidal incidents occurred, the FDA had consistently 
monitored the controversy about the relationship between SSRIs and 
adult suicide: denying citizen petitions for labeling change, extending the 
existing warning to new disorders, and relying on advisory committee 
recommendations.80 The court concluded that there was an ongoing 
dialectic, in which the FDA had unwaveringly taken the position that the 
defendants’ warning labels were adequate.81 
Most critically, in my view, to assessing the significance of this 
holding is the court’s insistence that conflict preemption determinations 
are case-specific, and its concomitant careful delineation of what was not 
being decided: 
[W]e need not decide whether preemption would be appropriate under different 
facts—such as where the FDA had not rejected the substance of the warning 
sought or where the FDA only stated its position after a lawsuit had been 
initiated—or under the broader theories of preemption argued by the parties. 
Thus, we do not decide whether the FDA’s mere approval of drug labeling is 
sufficient to preempt state law claims alleging that the labeling failed to warn 
of a given danger, [or] whether FDA approval of drug labeling constitutes 
minimum standards in the absence of the FDA’s express rejection of a specific 
warning . . . .82 
It is these factual scenarios, put aside for another day by the 
court, that are critical to defining in further detail the limits of conflict 
preemption. In my view, the court has in fact articulated precisely where 
the boundaries should be drawn, with each of the prospective scenarios 
falling outside the scope of preemption. If the FDA had not rejected the 
substance of the proposed warning, had only stated its position after the 
onset of the litigation, or had relied on its mere approval of the label, 
preemption would be unwarranted, as I see it, because the tort claim 
would be raising evidentiary issues on which the FDA had not taken a 
determinative position.83 
  
  79 Id. at 257. 
 80 Id. at 269-70. 
  81 Id. at 271.  
 82 Id.  
 83 The Colacicco opinion, in fact, tips its hand on the “mere approval” question when it 
explicitly distinguishes “between the agency’s legal position in its amicus brief and its factual 
representations”: 
The FDA’s summary of its scientific determinations must be distinguished from the 
agency’s construction of a statute, as the review of scientific information is strictly within 
its expertise. The FDA asserted facts [in this case] in support of its legal position, and we 
take notice of its statement of those facts, rather than its legal position.  
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By contrast, the Vioxx litigation is illuminating.84 In the early 
1990s, Merck began to develop plans for marketing Vioxx, a non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID), as research indicated that it 
suppressed the pain and inflammation of arthritis sufferers, without 
causing the side-effects of gastrointestinal perforations and bleeding 
often associated with the competing over-the-counter products already on 
the market.85  
From the outset, Merck scientists expressed unease about 
possible adverse cardiac consequences of the product. But in September 
  
Id. at 270 n.15. 
  This question has been widely discussed in the context of the FDA preamble on 
preemption, see Sharkey, supra note 58, at 421-24, with the focal point being whether the agency’s 
assertion of plenary power to preempt under the FDCA should be given Chevron deference or more 
limited Skidmore deference. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 
837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). I see no reason why the agency’s views 
on congressional intent should be afforded any weight at all; the FDA has no comparative expertise 
advantage over the judiciary when it comes to statutory construction. The Wyeth majority reached a 
similar conclusion. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-01 (2009).  
 84 For detailed discussion of the history of Vioxx development and regulation, see 
McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (NJ Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Alex Berenson, et al., 
Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1. 
The following brief discussion of the Vioxx litigation is based on these sources. 
 85 A good description of the perceived health benefits of Vioxx is offered in In re Vioxx 
Products Liability Litigation, 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570-71 (E.D. La. 2005)):  
Vioxx (known generically as rofecoxib) belongs to a general class of pain 
relievers known as non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”). This class 
of drugs contains well-known medications sold either over the counter-such as 
Advil (ibuprofen) and Aleve (naproxen)-or by prescription-such as Daypro 
(oxaprozin) and Voltaren (diclofenac). NSAIDs work by inhibiting cyclooxygenase 
(COX), an enzyme that stimulates synthesis of prostaglandins, which are chemicals 
produced in the body that promote certain effects. 
 
Traditional NSAIDs have been a longstanding treatment option for patients 
needing relief from chronic or acute inflammation and pain associated with 
osteoarthritis. [sic] rheumatoid arthritis, and other musculoskeletal conditions. This 
relief, however, comes with significant adverse side effects. Specifically, 
traditional NSAIDs greatly increase the risk of gastrointestinal perforations, 
ulcers, and bleeds (“PUBs”). This risk is increased when high doses are 
ingested, which is often necessary to remedy chronic or acute inflammation and 
pain. Scientists estimated that traditional NSAID-induced PUBs caused a 
significant number of deaths and hospitalizations each year in the United States. 
 
In the early 1990s, scientists discovered that the COX enzyme had two forms-COX-1 
and COX-2-each of which appeared to have several distinct functions. Scientists 
believed that COX-1 affected the synthesis or production of prostaglandins 
responsible for protection of the stomach lining, whereas COX-2 mediated the 
synthesis or production of prostaglandins responsible for pain and inflammation. 
This belief led scientists to hypothesize that “selective” NSAIDs designed to 
inhibit COX-2, but not COX-1, could offer the same pain relief as traditional 
NSAIDs with the reduced risk of fatal or debilitating PUBs. In addition, 
scientists believed that such drugs might be able to prove beneficial for the 
prevention or treatment of other conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease and 
certain cancers, where evidence suggested that inflammation may play a causative 
role. 
Id. 
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1999, when the FDA approved Vioxx for marketing, there was no 
conclusive evidence in that regard. Soon thereafter, however, unsettling 
data emerged. In March, 2000, a Merck study of 8,000 rheumatoid 
arthritis suffers, the Vigor study, compared the efficacy of Vioxx with 
that of a competing traditional NSAID product, Naproxen. Vioxx was 
found to be more efficacious than its competitor in reducing the 
gastrointestinal side-effects, but patients using it suffered five times as 
many heart attacks.  
More studies followed and the concerns in the scientific 
community mounted, but Merck maintained that the data were 
inconclusive: with regard to the Vigor study, for example, Merck argued 
that it was the cardiac-protective characteristics of Naproxen rather than 
heightened risks of Vioxx that explained the disparity in cardiac events. 
In the end, however, Merck voluntarily pulled the product off the market 
when Approve, an ongoing 2004 trial of the efficacy of Vioxx in 
preventing colon polyps, indicated alarming rates of heart problems in 
Vioxx users. 
During the four-year post-approval process, Merck reported its 
findings (and conclusions) to the FDA; independent scientists weighed 
in, often critically; and controversy raged within the agency itself. In 
particular, an in-house FDA scientist contended that his assessment of 
the Vioxx data, which indicated that Vioxx dramatically increased the 
risk of heart disease, was consistently suppressed by his superiors at the 
FDA. Most critically, however, throughout this period of agency 
monitoring, the FDA never arrived at a firm conclusion on cardiac risks 
associated with the product. The agency neither dismissed the growing 
evidence, nor on the other hand did it suggest that Merck change its 
label.86 
As tort suits came to be filed in steadily growing numbers—
exploding in volume after the product was removed from the market 
amidst great fanfare—the FDA remained agnostic in its stance on the 
cardiac risks posed by Vioxx.87 And concomitantly, the preemption 
defense played no substantial role in stemming the tide of lawsuits.88 
Nor should it have, in my view. Whether the scientific data, in 
fact, supported liability in tort has been hotly contested.89 Legitimate 
questions exist as to whether there was substantial new evidence of risk 
post-approval, both on the threshold issue of generic risk, and in 
  
 86  See supra note 84. 
 87 As of November 2004, 1000 plaintiff groups had filed 375 personal injury lawsuits 
against Merck, but after Vioxx’s withdrawal from the market, attorneys expected a significant 
increase in filings. See Alex Berenson, et al., supra note 84. 
 88 See, e.g., McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 251 (2008) (rejecting the defense). 
 89 Of the 18 cases tried to judgment prior to the national settlement, Merck won 13 and 
plaintiffs won 5, although some judgments for plaintiffs were later reversed on appeal. See Samuel 
Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289505#. 
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individual tort suits brought by users with a spectrum of confounding 
cardiac risk factors, as well as a wide range of temporal dose-response 
circumstances. But these questions of risk analysis that might serve as 
barriers to reanalysis in tort were not issues on which the FDA had taken 
a stand. And consequently, the Vioxx litigation provides a nice 
counterpoint to the earlier-discussed SSRI tort suits, illuminating the 
boundaries of regulatory preemption by sharpening the definition of new 
evidence, and keeping the defense narrow in scope.90   
B. Misrepresentations  
In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,91 the Supreme Court came full-
circle back to its initial venture in marking the territorial restrictions on 
tort law, the preemption clause in the cigarette labeling act. Reaffirming 
its earlier plurality opinion in Cipollone, the Court held that a claim of 
fraud—based in Altria on advertising “light” cigarettes as delivering 
reduced tar and nicotine—was not preempted by the labeling act’s 
preclusion of “requirements” related to smoking and health beyond those 
expressly delineated in the statute.92 
In a sharp dissent, Justice Thomas, writing for four members of 
the Court, twice noted the “theoretical [in]elegance” of carving out a 
divide between preempted claims of inadequate warning and non-
preempted claims of fraud.93 But the asserted inelegance of the 
distinction is entirely beside the point. There is no theoretical elegance to 
statutes such as the federal auto safety act, discussed earlier,94 that 
requires tortured reconciliation of a preemption and saving clause, or the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,95 a benefits scheme 
combining internally contradictory tort-centric and social welfare 
provisions.96 The interpretive task is to provide a defensible reading to 
congressional intent, not to evaluate theoretical elegance.97 
  
 90 See Alicia Mundy, FDA May Revise Warning for Antismoking Drug, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2008, at D3 for discussion of road accidents associated with the antismoking drug Chantix, 
another recent example of tort litigation against the backdrop of regulatory inconclusiveness. 
 91 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
 92 Id. at 549. 
 93 Id. at 553, 560 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 94 See discussion of Geier, supra Part II. 
 95 Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115 Stat. 237 (2001). 
 96 For discussion of its main provisions, see Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in 
Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 576-77 (2001). 
 97 Justice Thomas asserts in that regard that “[t]he text of the statute must control.” 
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 558 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But that is an entirely illusory view; the 
foundational reading of “requirements” in Cipollone to include tort suits cannot be found from 
textual reading of the preemption clause. It is based on an interpretive gloss—and a highly contested 
one at the time. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. Indeed, in my view, the generally 
accepted dichotomy between express and implied preemption is an oversimplification if it is taken to 
mean anything more than the difference between statutes that contain a preemption clause and those 
that do not. Defining the scope of an “express” preemption clause is always an interpretive matter 
(i.e., an exercise in implication). 
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In an important sense, the majority view in Altria provides a 
salient consideration in defining the scope of regulatory preemption 
provisions. The central thrust of Altria is to treat tort claims based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations as theoretically distinct from proscribed 
claims that would directly challenge the sufficiency of congressionally-
determined upper limits on warning language.98 Fraud is inherently an 
exercise in paying lip-service respect to the legislative labeling 
directives. Rather than challenging the adequacy of the required warning, 
the misrepresentation claim in Altria is premised on defendant creating a 
false sense of security that the legislative directive has been satisfied.99 
Similarly, in the context of regulatory directives, there is no 
reason to conclude that Congress would anticipate sweeping exemption 
from tort liability where the claim of industry misconduct is based on a 
polluting of the agency process rather than a challenge to its substantive 
determinations. For this reason, I would read Buckman narrowly, 
containing its reach to stand-alone fraud on the agency claims, as in the 
case itself—where the Court concluded that a private right of action 
would be inconsistent with the FDA’s self-policing authority.100 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In the preceding section, the focal point of my discussion was 
predominantly the intersection of FDA regulation and the tort system. It 
is a natural tack to pursue, both because it is highly topical (and much-
discussed by the commentators) at this point in time and due to the 
FDA’s intrinsic importance as a singularly comprehensive regulatory 
  
  In his Wyeth concurrence, Justice Thomas agrees with the holding that plaintiff’s tort 
claim is not preempted “[b]ecause implied preemption doctrines . . . wander far from the statutory 
text [and hence] are inconsistent with the Constitution.” Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 98 Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 551 (majority opinion).  
 99 Fraud claims are to preempted inadequate warning claims somewhat as manufacturing 
defect claims are to design defect claims: they are deviations from the legislative or regulatory norm 
rather than challenges to its adequacy. 
 100 See Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001) (consultant to a 
manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws was alleged to have supplied false information to the FDA 
in the product approval process). For detailed discussion of the issue, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The 
Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 841 (2008). Sharkey would impose a 
primary jurisdiction-type requirement as a prelude to a private tort suit: “Once the FDA has made a 
finding of such fraud . . . private litigants should be able to wield such findings offensively to pursue 
damages against manufacturers in their state law tort litigation and, where necessary, to disarm 
regulatory immunity or preemption.” Id. at 844. 
  I would not impose any such restriction on state tort law. If the FDA has, in fact, 
exercised “primary jurisdiction” then I would, as a matter of course, concur that a tort suit can make 
use of the agency finding. But I would also allow a tort suit on grounds of fraud (or other material 
misrepresentation) where the agency has made no such finding. Where the agency approval is 
materially based on false information, a tort suit is not in conflict with the agency finding under my 
constrained definition of conflict; that is, the agency directive was not grounded in the same 
evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry as the tort claim because the evidence before the agency was 
polluted. It follows, of course, that if the FDA has investigated and rejected the fraud or 
misrepresentation allegations, then it would be appropriate to preempt the tort claim. 
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authority that nonetheless cannot possibly achieve perfection in 
preventing unanticipated injuries. 
But my intent in this Article has been to be more all-
encompassing. In the course of my discussion, I have alluded to a wide 
array of regulatory schemes that generate a broad spectrum of agency 
directives creating tensions with accident law—tensions that have 
crystallized into preemption claims with increasing frequency in recent 
years. Whatever the political leaning of the executive branch, there is no 
reason to think that sharply disparate views on the appropriate scope of 
preemption claims will disappear from the policy arena. In proposing a 
framework for addressing these tensions, based on focused examination 
of whether the agency directive is grounded in the same evidence-based 
risk/benefit inquiry as the tort process would entail, I join those 
commentators who seek to forge a path that recognizes the distinct 
benefits that both regulation and tort have to offer.  
